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ABSTRACT
REDUCING THE RISKS OF WRONG SITE SURGERY
USING THE JOINT COMMISSION’S TARGETED SOLUTIONS
TOOL FOR SAFE SURGERY
by Stephanie Kelly Parks
May 2015
The purpose of this project was to utilize the Institute for HealthCare
Improvement’s Model of Improvement as a consultation framework to facilitate
improvement in core processes for the prevention of wrong site surgery (WSS) using The
Joint Commission Targeted Solutions Tool for Safe Surgery© Program at a surgery
center in Mississippi. The TST Program was conducted across 6 months and had 6
phases: 1) Getting Started, 2) Training Data Collectors, 3) Measuring Risk Factors, 4)
Analyzing Data, 5) Implementing Solutions, and 6) Sustaining the Gains. A
convenience sample of 47 surgical staff participated and 8 data collectors observed
behaviors. The nurse consultant, using the TST program, assisted staff in reducing the
risk of WSS from 16% to 9% in surgical booking, 86% to 53% in pre-op/holding, and
73% to 25% in the OR, and empowered them to make 9 practice decisions (just-in-time
coaching; improved communication between scheduling and pre-admissions; OR
schedule fax back; primary documents within 48 hours before surgery; standardized
patient verification; set up regional block time-out (TO) and role-based TO; standardized
surgical site marking and adoption of a surgical checklist). Nurse consultants play a
powerful role in enabling surgical staff to reexamine existing practice, change behavior,
and create a culture of safety in reducing the risks of WSS and promoting patient safety.

ii

COPYRIGHT BY
STEPHANIE KELLY PARKS
2015

The University of Southern Mississippi
REDUCING THE RISKS OF WRONG SITE SURGERY
USING THE JOINT COMMISSION’S TARGETED SOLUTIONS
TOOL FOR SAFE SURGERY

by
Stephanie Kelly Parks

A Capstone Project
Submitted to the Graduate School
of The University of Southern Mississippi
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree of Doctor of Nursing Practice

Approved:

Dr. Mary L. Coyne____________________
Committee Chair

Dr. Patsy L. Anderson__________________

Dr. Karen S. Coats____________________
Dean of the Graduate School

May 2015

DEDICATION
I dedicate this work to my family. A special feeling of gratitude to my parents
and partner, whose words of encouragement and unconditional love were felt in every
step of this achievement.
Finally, I dedicate this work to my Heavenly Father for answering all of my
prayers for strength and seeing this work through.

iii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I offer great appreciation to my committee chair, Dr. Mary Coyne, for
encouraging my writing and being a tremendous mentor. You taught my first research
course in my baccalaureate program and your partnership with this project made this
educational journey complete. Your advice on writing and ‘pushing the envelope’ have
been priceless. I would also like to thank Dr. Patsy Anderson for serving as my
committee member and the entire DNP faculty for the support and education.
I would like to acknowledge and thank the facility that gave me permission and
support to conduct this project. Your employees are the finest example of patient
advocates and guardians of patient safety.

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT………………………………………………………………………………ii
DEDICATION……………………………………………………………………………iii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS………………………………………………………………..iv
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS……………………………………………………..…….vii
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS………………………………………………………….viii
CHAPTER
I.

INTRODUCTION………………………………………………………...1
Statement of the Purpose
Consultation Framework - IHI ‘Model of Improvement’
Application of the IHI and TST Cycles for Sustained WSS Improvement
Significance of this Project
Review of Literature

II.

METHODOLOGY……………………………………………...……….19
Design
Setting
Population and Sampling Plan
Treatment
Measurement Tools
Training Observers/Data Collectors
Procedures
Protection of Human Subjects
Limitations
Proposed Data Analysis

III.

ANALYSIS OF DATA………………………………….………………28
Rate of Defect Defined
Presentation of Findings
Implementation of Targeted Solutions

IV.

SUMMARY……………………………………………………………...40
Summary of Findings
Discussion
v

Recommendations
Conclusions
APPENDICES…………………………………………………………………………...44
REFERENCES…………………………………………………………………………..55

vi

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
Figure
1.

IHI PDSA-Joint Commission Safe Surgery Program………………………….9

2.

IHI PDSA Model of Change………………………………………………….13

3.

Defect ranking for surgical booking-improvement data………...……………30

4.

Defect ranking for pre-op holding defects improvement data………………..32

5.

Defect ranking for operating room improvement data……………………….34

6.

Preadmission verification process…………………………………………… 36

vii

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
AORN

Association of periOperative Registered Nurses

ASC

Ambulatory Surgery Center

CITI

Collaborative Institutional Training Initiative

CRNA

Certified Registered Nurse Anesthetists

CTH

Center for Transforming Health

CMS

Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services

IHI

Institute for HealthCare Improvement

IOM

Institute of Medicine

JIT

Just-In-Time

OR

Operating Room

PDSA

Plan-Do-Study-Act

QIP

Quality Improvement Program

RN

Registered Nurse

RPI

Robust Product Improvement

TO

Time Out

TST

Targeted Solutions Tool

UP

Universal Protocol

WHO

World Health Organization

WSS

Wrong Site Surgery

WWII

World War II

viii

1
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Mr. King, a 51-year-old male with a history of type 2 diabetes and chronic
ulcerations of both lower extremities went to his physician because both heels were badly
inflamed with the left showing signs of slow improvement while the right heel showed
signs of infection. Upon examination, his physician informed him that he required a right
below-the-knee amputation as soon as possible due to the extent of the infection and
presence of wet gangrene extending above his ankle. Mr. King agreed to the surgery and
prior to his departure, the office staff scheduled the surgery with the surgeon and surgical
service. Mr. King was admitted through the emergency department for an amputation of
his right leg.
Immediately, the surgeon called ahead with orders and request to obtain a signed
surgical consent from the patient. Upon arrival on the surgical service, Mr. King signed
the surgical consent form and was prepped for the amputation. By the time the surgeon
arrived in the operating room (OR), the patient was intubated, asleep, and the procedure
was ready to begin. The surgeon made the incisions cutting through the major nerves and
arteries of the left leg. Several minutes later, an anxious circulating nurse called out to the
surgical team that the surgical consent was for the right leg. Well past the point of return,
the amputation was performed on Mr. King’s less infected and improving left leg
(Agrawal, 2014).
Medical Errors
In the United States, medical errors are the eighth leading cause of death,
exceeding the annual number associated with motor vehicle accidents (Institute of
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Medicine [IOM], 1999). Approximately, 44,000 to 98,000 people die due to medical–
related errors on an annual basis (IOM, 1999).
The Joint Commission, the primary accreditation group for many healthcare
organizations in the United States, has identified a set of critical health and medical
errors, referred to as ‘sentinel events,’ that compromise patient safety and which must be
immediately addressed. A sentinel event is defined as “an event that is unexpected and
involves death, serious physical or psychological injury, or the risk thereof” (Joint
Commission, 2014, p. 1). Wrong site surgery (WSS) is classified as a sentinel event
according to the Joint Commission.
Incidence of Wrong Site Surgery
The Joint Commission defines WSS as surgery on the wrong organ, wrong
person, or the wrong surgical site (Joint Commission, 2013), and states the problem is
worsening. In 2005, it was ranked the second most frequently reported sentinel event to
the Joint Commission, while it ranked number one in 2014 (Joint Commission, 2014).
Every year, approximately 2,000 patients or 40 patients per week are victimized by WSS
(Center for Transforming Health [CTH], 2011). Medical errors involving wrong-site,
wrong-procedure, or wrong-patient surgery have been estimated to potentially impact at
least one patient per year in a 300-bed hospital (Kelly, 2012).
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Failure of Site Verification in WSS
There are a myriad of human and system failures contributing to WSS. The
Institute of Medicine (IOM) notes that WSS is due to “faulty systems, processes, and
conditions that lead people to make mistakes or fail to prevent them” (IOM, 1999, p. 2).
At the core of these errors are communication failures. Examples of poor communication
related to WSS include, but are not limited to, the surgeon providing wrong site
information via phone to the surgical scheduler or the surgical scheduler incorrectly
transposing right from left sided procedures. Examples of incomplete patient assessments
are x-ray films accidently reversed or patients that are not physically examined by the
surgeon immediately prior to transport to the operating room. An example of an error in
judgment may be when surgery was intended for the left leg but staff prepped and draped
the right leg.
In the case of Mr. King, analysis reveals a series of system and communication
failures leading to the wrong leg amputated and, subsequently, the need for bilateral leg
amputations. The surgeon did not obtain surgical consent and site verification with the
patient but was instead obtained by surgery personnel; the wrong procedure was placed
on the surgical schedule; the operative site was not marked by the surgeon; the incorrect
leg was prepped and draped prior to the surgeon’s arrival to the OR; and there was no
‘Time-Out’ site verification performed by the surgical team prior to the first incision.
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Financial and Personal cost of WSS
WSS is avoidable; however, when it occurs it has financial consequences for
patients, providers, and health care facilities and an immeasurable impact on the quality
of life of patients. The severity and extent of damage related to the WSS determines the
personal and financial costs associated with the WSS.
The personal cost of WSS may have devastating emotional, physical, and
economic consequences for patients and their families, including but not limited to loss of
employment, income, mobility, and inability to engage in activities of daily living and
those activities that bring meaning to the patient. In the case of Mr. King, the state
authorities fined the surgeon $10,000 and suspended the surgeon’s license for a 6-month
period. The hospital paid Mr. King $900,000 and the surgeon paid an additional $250,000
directly to Mr. King (Agrawal, 2014).
The professional cost of WSS results in a negative impact on the surgical team.
Healthcare providers can become the ‘second victims’ when their patients are victimized
by adverse clinical events such as WSS. This phenomenon causes providers to question
their clinical skills, medical knowledge, and possibly their choice of career (Agrawal,
2014).
State licensure boards are imposing penalties on surgeons for WSS. Some
insurers have decided to no longer pay providers for WSS or wrong-person surgery, or
for leaving a foreign object in a patient’s body after surgery. Surgery performed on the
wrong site or wrong person has often been held compensable under malpractice claims.
In fact, “84% of wrong-site orthopedic and 79% of wrong-site eye surgery claims
resulted in malpractice awards” (Mulloy & Hughes, 2008, p. 381).
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The organizational cost of WSS is also costly. Loss of public trust in the
healthcare system and its providers occurs after negative media attention resulting from a
WSS event. Defending these types of errors is nearly impossible and those involved
usually pay a significant financial, professional, and emotional price for the event.
Efforts to Reduce WSS
In 1995, the Joint Commission required mandatory reporting of every WSS event.
According to the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (2015), the Joint
Commission developed and implemented The Universal Protocol for Preventing Wrong
Site, Wrong Procedure, and Wrong Person Surgery in 2004, also referred to as the
Universal Protocol (UP-Appendix A).
The three principal components of the UP included a pre-procedure verification,
site marking, and a time out (Joint Commission, 2015b). Since 2006, all hospitals,
ambulatory care facilities, and office-based surgery programs accredited by the Joint
Commission are required to use the UP and all insurance companies require adherence to
the UP for reimbursement.
The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) mandate that in order to
receive reimbursement, medical facilities must use a safe surgery checklist that reflects
the steps found in the UP. Beginning in 2015, the CMS have mandated that every health
care facility conducting surgical procedures must use a safe surgery checklist in order to
receive reimbursement. The checklist must demonstrate effective communication and
safe practices during three perioperative periods: prior to anesthesia, prior to skin
incision, and prior to the patient leaving the procedure area. While there is no one
specific mandated checklist, several exist to include one developed by the Universal
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Protocol established by the Joint Commission (Appendix A), the Surgical Safety
Checklist established by the World Health Organization (WHO-Appendix B), and the
Comprehensive Surgical Checklist established by the Association of periOperative
Registered Nurses (AORN-Appendix C).
In order to maximize patient safety, reduce the risks of WSS, and optimize quality
patient care and outcomes, the Joint Commission’s Center for Transforming Health
developed the Targeted Solutions Tool for Safe Surgery© Quality Improvement Program
(TST) to reduce the risk of WSS. The TST Program consists of a six-phase process
guiding health care organizations through a “step-by-step” process to accurately assess
their organization’s true performance, identify their barriers to performance excellence,
and facilitate them to proven solutions that specifically address their particular obstacles
(Center For Transforming Health [CTH], 2011). The phases progress from 1) Getting
Started, 2) Training Data Collectors, 3) Measuring Risk Factors, 4) Analyzing Data, 5)
Implementing Solutions, to 6) Sustaining the Gains. In the pilot test of the TST Program,
the 7 participating hospitals and ambulatory centers “were able to reduce the number of
cases with risks by 46 percent in the scheduling area, by 63 percent in pre-operative (preop), and by 51 percent in the OR” (Joint Commission, 2013, p. 2).
Statement of the Purpose
The purpose of this capstone project was to utilize the ‘Institute for HealthCare
Improvement’s (IHI) Model of Improvement (Langley, Nolan, Nolan, Norman, &
Provost, 2009) as a consultation framework to facilitate organizational improvement in
core processes for the prevention of wrong site surgery, i.e., wrong patient, organ, site,
procedure using The Joint Commission Targeted Solutions Tool for Safe Surgery©

7
Quality Improvement Program among a surgical team (schedulers, pre-op personnel,
perioperative personnel, and surgeons) at one ambulatory surgery center in South
Mississippi. The primary purposes of using the TST Program were to: 1) identify
breakdowns in patient care, 2) discover the underlying causes of the breakdown, and 3)
generate solutions that are organization-specific to the causes of wrong-site surgeries.

Consultation Framework - IHI “Model of Improvement”
The IHI ‘Model of Improvement’ (Langley et al., 2009) was used to facilitate
organizational improvement in core processes for the prevention of WSS using the TST
Program among a surgical team at one ambulatory surgery center in South Mississippi.
Fundamental concepts and steps of this change model are based on ‘Plan-Do-Study-Act’
(PDSA) cycle proposed by The Deming Institute (2013). The anticipated and achieved
outcome of this process was that the surgical team at one surgical center came to value
and incorporate the TST Program as the standard and best practices approach to reduce
the incidence of WSS.
Application of the IHI and TST Cycles for Sustained WSS Improvement
For this capstone project, concepts of the IHI ‘Plan-Do-Study-Act’ (PDSA)
Model of Improvement’ and TST cycles for sustained WSS improvement were utilized in
order to evoke a change in practice. The application of these processes is described below
and is illustrated in Figure 1.
•

During the ‘IHI Planning Phase’, the consultant facilitated change by
engaging several key players from the surgical team and organization in the
Getting Started TST Phase. By the end of this phase, the consultant assessed
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their buy-in and readiness to take action to adopt a safe surgery checklist for
reducing the risk of WSS at their facility (Joint Commission, 2014).
•

During the ‘IHI Doing Phase’, the consultant facilitated change by 1) enabling
the team to identify the specific types of data to be collected in each surgical
area using the appropriate forms, i.e., The Surgical Booking Process Audit
Tool, The Pre-op Holding Process Audit Tool and the Operating Audit Tool,
2) conducting the training of data collectors, and 3) assuring that data
collectors measured compliance with accuracy and a high level of inter-rater
reliability. This phase coincided with the TST phases of ‘Training Data
Collectors’ and ‘Measuring Risk Factors.’ The consultant was responsible
solely for entering all data into the secure Joint Commission Connect extranet
and generating findings.

•

During the ‘IHI Studying Phase’, the consultant presented the evidence-based
findings to the entire surgical team and facilitated a dialogue on analyzing
data that contribute to safe care and risk of errors by generating solutions for
improvement at the surgical center. This phase coincided with the TST phase
‘Analyzing Data.’

•

During the ‘IHI Acting Phase’, the consultant led the team to 1) implement
their solutions and 2) confirm a continuous quality improvement plan for ongoing measurement of compliance, sustaining positive changes evoked from
the process across over time, and educating new staff to this process. This
final phase coincided with the TST phases ‘Implementing Solutions’ and
‘Sustaining the Gains.’
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Figure 1. IHI PDSA-Joint Commission Safe Surgery Program.
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Significance of this Project
WSS is an avoidable event. Patient safety must be the core, overriding value of
every decision made by health professionals. To enact patient safety, we must not only
‘Do Good and Do No Harm’ but must create a culture of safety, challenging one another
to examine the prevalence, causes, and potential solutions for medical errors. The overall
aim of this project was to serve as an advanced practice nurse consultant empowering
surgical staff to reexamine existing practice, change behaviors as needed, and create a
culture of safety in reducing the risks of WSS and promoting patient safety.
Review of Literature
The following databases were used to investigate WSS and related topics:
Cochrane, PubMed of the National Library of Medicine, Cumulative Index of Nursing
and Allied Health Literature (CINAHL), and Google Scholar.
Human and System Failures Contributing to WSS
There is consensus (DeVine, Chutkan, Norvell, & Dettori, 2010; Dunn, 2006;
Hempel et al., 2013; Mulloy, 2008) in the reporting of evidence related to human and
system failures contributing to WSS. Communication is the leading error contributing to
WSS. In a systematic review, Hempel et al. (2013) identified 125 empirical studies and
four clinical practice guidelines published from 2004 through 2013 that reported causes
of WSS. Their analysis revealed that primary root causes of wrong-site surgery were due
to 1) communication problems such as incorrect information and misperceptions of
information, 2) not following policies, 3) not performing safety procedures in a
meaningful way, 4) inadequate policies, and 5) the lack of procedural standardization
contributed to WSS events. As an outcome of this evidence synthesis, the researchers
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recommended that a standardized protocol to prevent WSS be developed for all health
care facilities conducting surgeries.
By 2005, communication was cited as the major cause of WSS accounting for
70% of WSS, followed by “deficits of procedural compliance (64%), leadership (46%),
competency and credentialing (29%), availability of information (28%), organizational
culture (23%), orientation and training (20%), patient assessment (18%), care planning
(17%), staffing (10%), environmental safety/security (10%), and continuum of care
(5%)” (Joint Commission, 2013, p. 5). Mulloy (2008) found similar results when
examining the efficacy of the ‘AORN Correct Site Surgery Tool Kit’ (Appendix C) and
the UP (Appendix A) among 519 registered nurses and 325 non-registered nurse-surgical
technician respondents. A root cause analysis of WSS was conducted and revealed three
recurring communication risk situations: 1) communication failures with the patient and
among members of the surgical team, 2) communication failures during the preoperative
assessment of the patient, and 3) communication failures when verifying the correct
operative site. Mulloy (2008) found that 91% of registered nurses and 73% of nonregistered nurse--surgical technicians reported the AORN toolkit was helpful.
Dunn (2006) analyzed 455 WSS records and found that in 80% of the cases,
inadequate communication was the root cause of the event. Stahel et al. (2010) found that
out of 27,370 self-reported adverse occurrences, 85% of WSS events were due to errors
in judgment while 72% were due to failure to perform a surgical ‘time-out’ prior to
incision.
Surgical errors take a variety of forms. DeVine et al., (2010) conducted a
systematic review of 433,528 spinal surgical cases in Pennsylvania to determine the
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incidence of surgical errors. There were 427 incidences of WSS with 70% related to
wrong-side surgeries, 56% to ‘near-misses’, 14% to wrong location/level surgeries, 9% to
wrong procedures, and 8% to the wrong patient. The findings showed that WSS is the
result of breakdowns in communication related to incorrect surgical site verification and
incorrect communication between the surgical team. It also showed that WSS resulted
from failure to verify patient information prior to surgery. The clinical recommendations
of this systematic review suggest that the use of the Joint Commission UP alone is
insufficient to prevent WSS. From this review, the clinical recommendations posit that in
addition to the Joint Commission UP there be intraoperative images taken after the
surgical site is visualized. Preoperative images are then compared to these images in the
room to ensure the correct level of spinal surgery.
Use of the IHI ‘Model of Improvement’ in Health Care Organizations by the Consultant
The Plan-Do-Study-Act (PDSA) model for improvement is a helpful tool used to
rapidly change the way an organization operates in the health care industry. It was
originally developed by the Associates in Process Improvement then later adopted by the
Institute for Healthcare Improvement (IHI) to conduct rapid cycle research focused on
quality improvement in health care agencies.

13

PLAN

ACT

DO

STUDY

Figure 2. IHI PDSA Model of Change (How to Improve section, para. 2).
The IHI describes the phases as follows. During the ‘Plan Phase’, the consultant
guides the process by facilitating: 1) recruitment of team members, 2) drafting a purpose
statement, and 3) describing the problem, and identifying the causes of the problem.
During the ‘Do Phase’, the consultant aids the team in: 1) starting to implement action
plan for change and 2) collecting data pertinent to change topic. During the ‘Study
Phase’, the consultant guides the team in using the purpose statement from ‘Plan Phase’
and data gathered in ‘Do Phase’ in order to discern if 1) an improvement was made as
result of the plan selected, 2) if the plan was worth the investment, and 3) if there were
any unintended side effects. During the ‘Act Phase’, the consultant helps the team 1)
reflect on their plan and outcomes, 2) acknowledge their improvement and processes
learned, 3) verbalize successes to internal and external stakeholders, and 4) set in place
guidelines to preserve gains and sustain achievements.
Program in Health Care Organizations by the Consultant
The Center for Transforming Healthcare (CTH) created the TST Program to assist
health care organizations through a step-by-step process to identify, quantify, and reduce
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risks of WSS. The TST was first used in 2009 as a result of the Joint Commission’s
systematic approach of “Robust Process Improvement (RPI)” to analyze specific
breakdowns in care, discover their underlying causes, and develop solutions that are
targeted to the causes of wrong-site surgeries (Joint Commission, 2015c). The TST
Program focuses on minimizing risks across the surgical areas, including surgical
booking area, pre-op area, and the operating room. The TST Program addresses routine
surgeries only and excludes procedures done outside of the main operating room area,
such as, cystoscopies, endoscopies, surgical procedures coming from the emergency
department, and multiple procedures that occur during the same operative case that are
performed by different surgeons.
The TST Program is designed to be readily used by an organization’s surgical
team without requiring any additional resources to implement the program. Each of the
six steps outlines key action items that must be completed before the subsequent step is
initiated. The TST Program enables the surgical team to examine specific causes that
could result in a WSS event within their organization and provides them with a targeted
solution implementation plan for process improvement to reduce the risk of WSS.
Fundamental to the program is the use of Lean Six Sigma to enable the surgical team
from scheduler through incision to realize the causes of WSS and stop the chain of events
that result in the breakdown of patient care.
The six phases of TST Program are 1) ‘Getting Started’, 2) ‘Training Data
Collectors’, 3) ‘Measuring Risk Factors’, 4) ‘Analyzing Data’, 5) ‘Implementing
Solutions’, and 6) ‘Sustaining the Gains.’ Each of these phases is described on the
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website designed to assist organizations in the implementation of the tool (Joint
Commission, 2015d).
The ‘Getting Started Phase’ consists of defining the scope of the project and
gathering the surgical team and stakeholders to assess their buy-in and readiness to
change. During this phase, the consultant guides the process by facilitating 1) discussion
about safe surgery with surgical staff and 2) the identification of committed team
members and stakeholders.
The ‘Training Data Collectors Phase’, the consultant focuses on educating
observers to gain a clear picture of what is to be observed in three key surgical areas: 1)
the surgical booking area, 2) the pre-op holding area, and 3) the operating room. Data
collectors undergo specific training by watching area-specific videos, learning how to
correctly complete data collection audit tools, and must successfully complete a written
the “Safe Surgery” post-test with a 90% or higher score. Further, the data collectors are
trained to provide the observers in each area with ‘Just-in-Time’ coaching strategies
when near misses are anticipated.
During the ‘Measuring Risk Factors Phase’, the trained observers begin direct
observation of how procedures are performed in each of the three areas. Findings are
recorded on the data collection audit tools specific for each area. These baseline
observations are the basis for future comparisons of performance and improvements. The
TST Program recommends that baseline data be collected across a two-week time period
resulting in a minimum of 50-100 samples for each observation area. The consultant
enters the data into the secure Joint Commission CONNECT extranet and findings are
generated providing charts and statistical analyses of the data.
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During the ‘Analyzing Data Phase’, the consultant presents evidence-based
findings to the surgical team for discussion of factors contributing to safe and risky care.
Collectively, the surgical team generates solutions for immediate and long-term
improvement. Noteworthy is that many organizations are surprised to find vast
inconsistencies in practice discovered during this phase.
During the ‘Implementing Solutions Phase’, the consultant empowers staff to 1)
implement prioritized solutions generated from the previous phase and 2) identify at least
one just-in-time (JIT) coach, such as a manager, nurse, technician and/or surgeon to serve
as an informal change agent and reinforce new actions or behaviors in the surgical
booking area, pre-op holding area, and the operating room. All solutions must be
implemented to make the greatest impact of reducing the risk of WSS and creating a
culture of safety. This is a critical decision-making time for the team, that is, they either
change identified problems or resume old patterns that increase their risk of WSS.
The hallmark of the ‘Sustaining the Gains Phase’ is that quality improvement has
occurred and is demonstrated in fewer errors/defects and/or greater adherence with best
practices in reducing the risks of WSS. In this phase, the consultant helps the team 1)
reflect on their plan and outcomes, 2) acknowledge their improvement and processes
learned, 3) verbalize successes to internal and external stakeholders, and 4) set in place
guidelines to preserve gains and sustain achievements. Several solutions to sustain gains
are to train new WSS observers, perform monthly observations for continued compliance,
and continuance of JIT coach training.
There is a paucity of research evidence related to the effectiveness of the TST
Program on reducing WSS. The Joint Commission (Health Research & Educational
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Trust and Joint Commission Center for Transforming Healthcare, 2014) conducted a pilot
test of the effectiveness of the TST Program in reducing WSS was conducted among 8
participating hospitals and ambulatory centers. The pretest analysis of WSS-related
errors was classified according to the location of where the error occurred, i.e., the
scheduling area, the preoperative holding area or the operating room. The errors in the
scheduling, area included but were not limited to unverified booking documents, verbal
requests for surgical booking, illegible handwriting and unapproved abbreviations.
Errors in the pre-operative holding area included but were not limited to missing primary
documents, unresolved preoperative paperwork, inconsistent use of site marking, and
rushing during patient verification. Errors in the operating room included but were not
limited to lack of site verification, distractions during Time-Out, omitted Time-Out, or
Time-Out performed without full surgical team participation.
Role of the Nurse Consultant in Facilitating Change in Health Care Organizations
The role of the nurse consultant is to empower health care providers and
organizations with the knowledge and skills necessary to provide quality-based, safe and
cost-effective patient care. Manley (2001) identified six core skills and qualities required
of a nurse consultant:
1) Apply the practice of nursing to a specific client group, 2) Have leadership and
strategic vision for the organization, 3) Use evidence of literature that focuses on
day-to day issues in nursing practice, 4) Facilitate practice development and
structural, 5) Create a learning culture, one that enables all members of the
interdisciplinary team to learn and develop their potential, and 6) Provide a
continuum of consultation from the individual at the clinical level to the managers
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and directors at the organizational level in terms of the provision of patientcentered services. (p. 30)
Hicks, James, Hill, and Vanterpool (2012) discovered that patients who received
care at clinics led by nurse consultants reported significantly positive medical outcomes
when compared to clinics without nurse consultants. In this study, participants reported a
feeling of partnership with the nurse consultant and this partnership instilled a feeling of
confidence in the patient’s ability to better control their diabetes. In another study,
Manley (2000) reported that nurse consultants provided clear direction and vision to
patients and staff, motivated others to use their clinical skills, and helped develop
evidence-based practice.
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CHAPTER II
METHODOLOGY
The purpose of this capstone project was to utilize the ‘Institute for HealthCare
Improvement’s (IHI) Model of Improvement (Langley et al., 2009) as a consultation
framework to facilitate organizational improvement in core processes for the prevention
of wrong site surgery, i.e., wrong patient, organ, site, procedure using the TST Program
among a surgical team (schedulers, preoperative personnel, perioperative personnel, and
surgeons) at one ambulatory surgery center in South Mississippi. The methodology is
organized as follows: 1) Design; 2) Setting, 3) Population and Sampling Plan, 4)
Treatment, 5) Measurement Tools, 6) Training Observers/Data Collectors, 7) Procedures,
8) Protection of Human Subjects, 9) Limitations, and 10) Proposed Data Analysis.
Design
This capstone project was focused on quality improvement and used a quasiexperimental design with a prediction and control approach.
Setting
The setting for this project was one ambulatory surgery center (ASC) with four
(4) operating rooms in south Mississippi. ASCs are “modern health care facilities that
provide same-day surgical care to include but not limited to diagnostic and preventive
procedures” ("What is an ASC?" 2014, para. 2). These health care facilities offer patients
an alternative to hospital-based procedures in a convenient, patient-centered experience.
This 100% physician-owned ASC provides care for the following specialties: ear-nosethroat (ENT), gastroenterology, general surgery, ophthalmology, orthopedic, pain
management, and plastic surgery.
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Population and Sampling Plan
The subjects/participants for this capstone project were the surgical and support
staff of one surgical center in South Mississippi. The forty-seven (47) member staff
worked in the following areas: Surgical Booking Area (n=2 Registered Nurses[RN]); Preop Holding Area (n=6 RNs); and Surgical Areas (n=8 RNs, n=9 Surgical Technicians,
n=5 Certified Registered Nurse Anesthetists [CRNAs], n=5 Anesthesiologists, and n=12
Surgeons). All participants were either full-time or part-time employees at the surgical
center and were licensed in their respective specialty areas. All staff were eligible for
participation in this project based on employment in the surgical center. A conveniencesampling plan was used to select the surgery center. There was no random selection from
the population or random assignment to either an experimental or control group.
Treatment
The independent variable was The Joint Commission Targeted Solutions Tool for
Safe Surgery© Quality Improvement Program (TST Program) and the dependent variable
was risk of wrong site surgery. All surgical procedures were eligible for observation in
this project with the exception of endoscopies and multiple procedures that occurred
during the same operative case that were performed by different surgeons.
Measurement Tools
The capstone project utilized three tools to measure risks associated with WSS.
The tools were the audit forms for the three specific areas of observation: scheduling,
pre-op holding, and operating room developed and tested by The Joint Commission. No
information was provided regarding the validity and reliability of the tools.
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Audit Observation Forms
The “Surgical Booking Process Audit Tool” (Appendix D) was comprised of six
items and was used to record: 1) Specialty (Surgical) Type, 2) How booking was
received, 3) Receipt of Forms Defects, 4) Booking Form Defect and 5) Coaching if
necessary. A trained observer who was an RN who has worked in this area for 7 years
completed this tool.
The “Pre-Op Holding Process Audit Tool” (Appendix E) was comprised of eight
items and was used to record: 1) Specialty (Surgical) Type, 2) Primary Document
Verification, 3) Patient Verification, 4) Rushing Elements, 5) Time-Out Elements, 6)
Regional Block Elements, and 6) Coaching if necessary. A trained observer who was a
RN who has worked in this area for 12 months or longer completed this tool.
The “Operating Room Audit Tool” (Appendix F) was comprised of sixteen items
and was used to record: 1) Specialty (Surgical) Type, 2) Consent Elements, 3) Rushing
Elements, 4) Site Marking Elements, 5) Time-Out Elements, and 6) Coaching if
necessary. This tool was completed by 5 trained observers who were CRNAs who have
worked in this area for 5 years or longer.
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Training Observers/Data Collectors
During Phase II: Training Data Collectors, eight (8) data collectors were trained
to observe specific events in their respective locations using standardized video training
materials provided by The Joint Commission TST Program. Training was conducted by
the nurse consultant and the method for training the eight data collectors consisted of
having each observer view a 30-minute video produced by the Joint Commission that
explained the use of the TST Program and the location-specific observation form
(Appendix D-F) for each of the three areas. After viewing the instructional video, the
participant was required to pass the Joint Commission provided 14-item exam with a
90% or higher. If potential errors were anticipated, then observers were instructed to
move into the ‘Just-in-Time’ coaching role to prevent an error. Prior to training, all
observers provided written informed consent to participate in the project.
Procedures
The procedure utilized in the capstone project was as follows:
1. The student, chair, and committee members of the doctoral capstone project have
successfully completed the Common Course at The University of Southern
Mississippi and obtained Institutional Review Board approval prior to the conduction
of the QIP. The Univeristy of Southern Mississippi IRB approval letter is displayed
in Appendix H.
2. Obtained written approval to conduct the quality improvement program (QIP) from
key stakeholders of the Surgical Center, including the Director and Board of
Directors (Phase 1: Getting Started).
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3. Posted informational flyers in strategic areas of the center to alert staff to an
explanatory meeting about the quality improvement study.
4. At the beginning of the program, the student serving in the role of consultant
provided participants with information about conditions of participation:
a. Participation: Participants may choose to participate and/or not participate in the
QIP program. Note: Participants are observed only and do not complete any
questionnaires.
b. Program Benefits: The potential benefits of the QIP is that the risks of WSS are
reduced and that the center is able to 1) identify breakdowns in patient care, 2)
discover the underlying causes of the breakdown, and 3) generate solutions that
are organization-specific to the causes of wrong-site surgeries.
c. Program Risks: There are no identified bio-psycho-social risks, discomforts,
and/or inconveniences associated with participation in the QIP.
d. Confidentiality and Anonymity: No participant will complete any questionnaire
associated with this study. No participant will be identified by name in any audit
tool associated with this QIP. On each of the three audit tools, numeric codes will
be used to identify surgeons and the last four digits of a patient’s record for case
identification. No participant will be identified by name in any report or
publication associated with the QIP. No individual data will be shared about any
staff member with the administration of the surgical center. Only the student will
examine, have access to, and enter completed audits into software program for
data analysis. Electronic data will be password protected and physical data will be
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locked in a file drawer. All completed audits will be shredded within three
months following the analysis of data.
5. Conducted Phase II: Training Data Collectors – See Training Observers/Data
Collectors. This phase was accomplished in 2 days.
6. Conducted Phase III: Measuring Risk Factors. Trained observers recorded practices
in the Surgical Booking area, Pre-op/Holding area, and Surgical Areas until 50-100
observations were completed. If potential errors occurred, then the observer moved
into the ‘Just-in-Time’ coaching role to prevent the error. This phase was
accomplished in 2 weeks. Methods to control for threats to validity were executed
during this phase, that is, the first two days of observations were discarded to
minimize the Hawthorne effect (Campbell, J., Maxey, V., & Watson, W.,1995).
7. The consultant entered all data collected into the TST data analysis program via the
secured Joint Commission Connect Extranet. The TST Data Analysis Program is in
Excel© format and provides data entry and analysis in numeric and graphic format.
This program was used by the consultant only.
8. Conducted Phase IV: Analyzing Data. During this phase, the consultant presented
evidence-based findings to the surgical team for discussion of factors contributing to
safe and risky care. Collectively, the surgical team generated solutions for immediate
and long-term improvement. This phase was accomplished in 5 days.
9. Conduct Phase V: Implementing Solutions. During this phase, the consultant
empowered staff to 1) implement prioritized solutions generated from the previous
phase and 2) identify at least one just-in-time (JIT) coach, such as a manager, nurse,
technician and/or surgeon to serve as an informal change agent and reinforce new
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actions or behaviors in the surgical booking area, pre-op holding area, and the
operating room. This phase was accomplished in 2 weeks.
10. Conduct Phase VI: Sustaining the Gains. In this phase, the consultant helped the
team 1) reflect on their plan and outcomes, 2) acknowledge their improvement and
processes learned, 3) verbalize successes to internal and external stakeholders, and 4)
set in place guidelines to preserve gains and sustain achievements. This phase was
presented in 1 day but is an on-going process.
11. Will destroy completed audits by shredding within three months following the
analysis of data and no later than one month after graduation.
Protection of Human Subjects
In order to ensure the protection of human subjects, the student, chair and
committee members of the doctoral capstone project successfully completed the CITI
Common Course at The University of Southern Mississippi and sought Institutional
Review Board approval prior to the conduct of the QIP. Written approval to conduct the
quality improvement program (QIP) from key stakeholders of the Surgical Center,
including the Director and Board of Directors was completed during the first phase,
Getting Started, of the QIP. At the beginning of the program, the student serving in the
role of consultant provided participants with information about conditions of
participation. Participants chose to participate or not participate in the QIP program.
Participants were observed and did not complete any questionnaires.
The potential benefits of the QIP is that the risks of WSS are reduced and that
the center is able to 1) identify breakdowns in patient care, 2) discover the underlying
causes of the breakdown, and 3) generate solutions that are organization-specific to the
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causes of wrong-site surgeries. There were no identified bio-psycho-social risks,
discomforts, and/or inconveniences associated with participation in the QIP.
No participant was identified by name in any audit tool associated with this QIP.
On each of the three audit tools, numeric codes were used to identify surgeons and the
last four digits of a patient’s record for case identification. No participant was identified
by name in any report or publication associated with the QIP. No individual data was
shared about any staff member with the administration of the surgical center. Only the
student examined, had access to and entered completed audits into software program for
data analysis. Electronic data was password protected and physical data was locked in a
file drawer. All completed audits will be shredded within three months following the
analysis of data.
Limitations
A limitation of this QIP was that only one ASC was used and the facility is small
when compared to a freestanding hospital. When compared to other surgery centers, the
ASC used in this study was classified as “medium”, having 3-4 operating rooms (Fields,
2011, p. 1). The number of observations recommended by the Joint Commission is 100
for each of the three areas: scheduling, pre-op holding, and operating room.
Observations totaling less than this number could result in a misrepresentation sample
and therefore render the pretest data inaccurate or misleading.
Proposed Data Analysis
Descriptive statistics, that is, frequency distributions and measures of central
tendency were used to analyze the data. A comparative analysis of differences in mean
compliance scores between ‘Measuring Risk Factors Phase’ and ‘Implementing
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Solutions Phase’ was conducted using the TST Data software developed by The Joint
Commission. The TST Data Software was used to: 1) Enter data from the three audit
tools, 2) Generate charts based on the data, and 3) Analyze and interpret the data. The
rate of defective case charts are defined and displayed in Appendix G.
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CHAPTER III
ANALYSIS OF DATA
The purpose of this capstone project was to utilize the ‘Institute for HealthCare
Improvement’s (IHI) Model of Improvement (Langley et al., 2009) as a consultation
framework to facilitate organizational improvement in core processes for the prevention
of wrong site surgery, i.e., wrong patient, organ, site, procedure using The Joint
Commission Targeted Solutions Tool for Safe Surgery© Quality Improvement Program
among a surgical team (schedulers, preoperative personnel, perioperative personnel, and
surgeons) at one ambulatory surgery center in South Mississippi. The analysis of data is
organized as follows: 1) Rate of Defect Defined, 2) Presentation of Findings, and 3) the
Implementation of Targeted Solutions.
Rate of Defect Defined
The TST Program (Defect Defined, 2015, p. 4) defined a defect in any of the three
areas of observation as “a risk point for wrong site surgery…referring to a process that is
or could be inconsistent with organization policy…a single operative case may have
multiple defects”. The findings from this study revealed that there were defects in each
of the three areas of observation.
Presentation of Findings
The project was conducted in one ‘medium-sized’, physician-owned, ambulatory
surgical center in south Mississippi across a six-month time period. A convenience
sample of forty-seven (47) staff including RNs, surgical technicians, CRNAs,
anesthesiologists and surgeons participated in the study. Eight observers were trained to
collect data in the surgical booking, pre-op holding, and operating room.
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Baseline data was collected by trained observers during Phase III: Measuring
Risk Factors and are reported according to the three areas of observation: surgical
booking, pre-op holding, and operating room. Improvement data was collected by
trained observers during Phase IV: Implementing Solutions and are reported according to
the three areas of observation: surgical booking, pre-op holding, and operating room.
Surgical Booking Findings
Baseline findings revealed that there were 63 observations made in the Surgical
booking area. The rate of defective cases in this area was 16% (Figure 3). The most
common errors were 1) surgical form not received within 48 hours (83%, n=5
observations) and 2) date and time of procedure missing (25%, n=2 observations). No
‘Just-in-Time’ coaching were provided during this time frame.
Improvement findings revealed that there were 64 observations made in the
Surgical booking area. The rate of defective cases chart shows improvement from 16% to
9% (Figure 3). The most common errors were 1) surgical form not received within 48
hours (n=5 observations) and 2) date and time of procedure missing (n=1 observations).
No ‘Just-in-Time’ coaching events were provided during this time frame.
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Figure 3. Line graph for baseline and improvement rate of defective cases in surgical
booking based on days observed that show a defective rate improvement from 16% to 9%
based on 64 post-test observations.
Pre-op Holding Findings
Baseline findings revealed that there were 95 observations made in the Pre-op
Holding area. The rate of defective cases in this area was 87% (Figure 4). The most
common errors were 1) errors on primary document verification (41%, n=78
observations), 2) errors in patient verification (38%, n=67 observations), 3) errors in
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elements of ‘Time-Out’ (15%, n= 26 observations), and 4) elements of ‘rushing’ (3%,
n=6 observations). One ‘Just-in-Time’ coaching event was provided during this time
frame.
Improvement findings revealed that there were 98 observations made in the Preop Holding area. The rate of defective cases in this area improved from 87% to 53%
(Figure 4). The most common errors were 1) errors in patient verification (54%, n=48
observations), 2) errors on primary document verification (32%, n=20 observations), 3)
errors in elements of ‘Time-Out’ (15%, n= 13 observations). There were no errors in
rushing observed during this time period. There were no ‘Just-in-Time’ coaching events
provided during this time frame.
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Figure 4. Line graph comparison between the baseline data to the improvement data of
defective cases in pre-op holding based on days observed. The defective case rate
improved from 86% to 53% based on 98 observations.
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Operating Room Findings
Baseline findings revealed that there were 56 observations made in the Operating
Room area. The rate of defective cases in this area was 73% (Figure 5). The most
common errors were 1) errors in elements of ‘Time-Out’ (90%, n=83 observations), 2)
errors in consent elements (5%, n=5 observations), and 3) errors in site marking elements
(4%, n= 4 observations). There were no ‘Just-in-Time’ coaching events provided during
this time frame.
Improvement findings revealed that there were 68 observations made in the
Operating Room area. The rate of defective cases in this area improved from 73% to 25%
(Figure 5). The most common and only error was in elements of ‘Time-Out’ (n=18
observations). There were no ‘Just-in-Time’ coaching events provided during this time
frame.
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Figure 5. Line graph for baseline and improvement rate of defective cases in surgical
booking based on days observed that show that the improvement phase defective case
rate improved from 73% to 25% when compared to the baseline phase.
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The Implementation of Targeted Solutions
Once the baseline data was collected, the results were analyzed during Phase IV:
Analyzing Data in order to identify and prioritize targeted solutions to reduce the risk of
WSS. During Phase V: Implementing Solutions, the consultant collaborated with staff to
1) implement prioritized solutions generated from the previous phase and 2) identify at
least one just-in-time (JIT) coach, such as a manager, nurse, technician and/or surgeon to
serve as an informal change agent and reinforce new actions or behaviors in the surgical
booking area, pre-op holding area, and the operating room. The Targeted Solutions
chosen and implemented by the surgical team are presented below in the following order:
surgical booking, pre-op holding, and operating room.
Surgical Booking Area
The targeted solutions chosen by staff for implementation in the surgical booking
area to reduce the risk of WSS in their area were: 1) to improve communication between
scheduling and pre-admissions departments and 2) to establish an OR schedule fax back.
Each strategy is described below.
In order to improve communication between the scheduling and pre-admissions
department, the staff adopted two best practices strategies. Strategy one consisted of the
following: If booking documents are not compared between departments and changes
communicated before the day of surgery, inconsistencies are forced to be resolved the
day of surgery resulting in confusion and elements of rushing in attempts to stay on time.
This could cause the patient to have a negative perception or lack of trust if asked to
confirm inaccurate information the day of surgery. In order to improve communication
between scheduling and pre-admissions department, the pre-admission staff will compare
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the history and physical examination (H&P) and consent forms with the operative
schedule to ensure information is complete and consistent. The following flow sheet
(Figure 6) demonstrates the pre-admission verification process.

Figure 6. Visual map documenting the improved flow of information between the
scheduling and pre-admissions department.
The second strategy adopted was the OR schedule fax back. Incorrect OR
schedules lead to the need to correct the OR schedule and primary documents producing
possible delays in surgery start times. The OR schedule is confirmed with the
physician’s office the day before surgery but this call can occur at an inconvenient time,
resulting in missed or incorrect information regarding details of the procedure. In order
to reduce the risk of incorrect information, the OR schedule will be faxed to the
physician’s office by 5 p.m. the day prior to surgery and included in the fax will be a
deadline for the office to fax back the schedule with any changes.
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Pre-op/holding Area
The following targeted solutions were chosen by staff for implementation in the
pre-op/holding area in order to reduce the risk of WSS in their area: 1) Assure that
primary documents are available 48 hours before surgery, 2) Establish a standardized
patient verification process, and 3) Implement a regional block Time Out (TO).
In order to assure that primary documents are available 48 hours before surgery,
the staff adopted three best practices strategies. Primary document that arrive at the
surgery center prior to surgery may contain errors. Failing to verify information on the
primary documents and continuing to communicate misinformation can increase the risk
of WSS. Each organization establishes their guidelines of how far in advance a surgical
consent can be signed by the physician. One requirement that is universal is there must
be a physician signature and date on the consent. In order to eliminate the occurrence of
missing or incomplete primary documents, the preadmissions personnel will compare the
information on the consent to that on the H&P and OR schedule. When inconsistencies
are discovered, the physician’s office will be contacted before the day of surgery so that
corrections can be made.
A standardized patient verification process is the first line of defense in reducing
the risk of WSS. There exists the perception that patients will be irritated by the need to
repeat requests to identify themselves. However, the risk of WSS far outweighs the
decision to omit the patient verification process. In order to improve the patient
verification process, all members of the surgical team will verify patient information in
the pre-op/holding area.
A common surgical error is that regional blocks, such as retrobulbar block for
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cataract surgery are being conducted without a Time Out. These surgical procedures are
often performed in the pre-op/holding area and not in an OR. The incidence of block
procedures is increasing and so is the incidence of related errors. The staff confirmed that
prior to starting a regional block regardless of setting, i.e., the pre-op/holding area or OR:
1) a regional block TO will be performed and verified by a team member and 2) the
correct procedure site and side will be verified by a team member.
Operating Room Area
The following targeted solutions were chosen by staff for implementation in the
operating room area in order to reduce the risk of WSS in their area: 1) Role-based TO,
and 2) Standardize surgical site marking. Each strategy is described below.
In most organizations, the TO is conducted by a single individual who reads the
required information, i.e., name of patient, second patient identifier, procedure, site, and
surgeon to the surgery team. Many times members of the surgical team are actively
engaged in other duties and are not listening to the TO information. Common
contributing factors to the disengaged team is the belief that the TO is of little value to
the team, team members may be distracted or talking during the TO, misinformation
regarding who should initiate the TO, and confusion as to when the TO should be
initiated. The standards of practice established by The Joint Commission (2015) are that
1) the TO should be initiated after patient prep and drape but immediately before skin
incision, 2) all members of the team should be involved in the TO process and stop all
other activities and conversations during the TO process, and 3) verbal confirmation of
the TO information is then confirmed by all team members. The staff agreed that in
order to improve the role-based TO process: 1) the TO will be scripted and consistent
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across all surgical procedures and 2) adopted the Comprehensive Surgical Checklist
established by the Association of periOperative Registered Nurses (AORN-Appendix C).
In order to avoid WSS and to promote patient safety, it is critical that the process
for surgical site marking be standardized. Unfortunately, there are a myriad of site
marking systems that are used, that is each surgeons may use a different mark, patients
sometimes mark themselves, and the same mark may mean something different to each
individual. A standardized system of site marking is a safety strategy for the patient, the
surgical team and the facility. Finally, a standardized mark, such as the surgeon’s initials
versus the use of an ‘X’, which could be interpreted by some as ‘no’ and ‘yes’ by others,
or use of dots or lines with arrows, creates less confusion over which site mark is correct.
In order to clarify the various types of site markings, the surgery team decided to use the
surgeon’s initials as the standardized surgical site marking system. Standardization means
that all personnel at the facility will know which site marking to look for and use. The
staff agreed that in order to standardize surgical site markings, the surgeon’s initials will
be placed on the patient’s skin closest to the site of proposed incision.
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CHAPTER IV
SUMMARY
The purpose of this capstone project was to utilize the ‘Institute for HealthCare
Improvement’s (IHI) Model of Improvement (Langley et al., 2009) as a consultation
framework to facilitate organizational improvement in core processes for the prevention
of wrong site surgery, i.e., wrong patient, organ, site, procedure, using The Joint
Commission Targeted Solutions Tool for Safe Surgery© Quality Improvement Program
among a surgical team (schedulers, preoperative personnel, perioperative personnel, and
surgeons) at one ambulatory surgery center in South Mississippi. The chapter is
organized as follows: 1) Summary of Findings, 2) Discussion, 3) Recommendations, and
4) Conclusions.
Summary of Findings
The major findings of this project were that by implementing the Targeted
Solutions Tool for Safe Surgery© QIP program, the nurse consultant was able to assist
the surgical center in reducing the risk of wrong site surgery from 16% to 9% in the
surgery booking area, from 86% to 53% in the pre-op holding area, and from 73% to 25%
in the operating room area. These results mirror the findings from the original 8 hospitals
and ambulatory centers participating in the pilot test of the TST Program (Joint
Commission, 2013). Further, the consultant empowered the surgical team to make nine
(9) critical decisions in practice that would have the greatest impact on reducing the risk
of WSS and creating a culture of safety:
1) Identified at least one just-in-time (JIT) coach, such as a manager, nurse,
technician and/or surgeon to serve as an informal change agent and reinforce new
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actions or behaviors in the surgical booking area, pre-op holding area, and the
operating room;
2) Improved the communication system between scheduling and pre-admissions
departments;
3) Established an OR schedule fax back;
4) Assured that primary documents would be available 48 hours before surgery;
5) Established a standardized patient verification process;
6) Implemented a regional block Time Out (TO);
7) Role-based TO;
8) Standardized a surgical site marking; and
9) Adopted the Comprehensive Surgical Checklist established by the Association of
periOperative Registered Nurses (AORN-Appendix C).
Discussion
The findings from this QIP capstone project reflect the conceptual and evidencebased literature regarding the importance of reducing medical errors and, in particular,
efforts to reduce the risks of WSS (Agrawal, 2014; IOM, 1999; Kelly, 2012; Mulloy &
Hughes, 2008) through the use of 1) a universal protocol for preventing WSS (Agency
for Healthcare Research and Quality, 2015; AORN, 2015; CTH, 2011; WHO, 2015); 2) a
standardized system of site verification (IOM, 1999; Joint Commission, 2015b); and 3)
resolving human and system failures contributing to WSS (DeVine et al., 2010; Dunn,
2006; Hempel et al., 2013; Mulloy, 2008; Stahel et al., 2010).
Nurse consultants play a critical role in empowering health care providers and
organizations with the knowledge and skills necessary to provide quality-based, safe and
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cost-effective patient care (Manley, 2001; Hicks et al., 2012). In this QIP project, the
nurse consultant utilized both the IHI (Langley et al., 2009) and TST (Joint Commission,
2015d) programs to enable staff to reduce the risk of WSS. The consultant found that
each step of the TST program was easy to use, readily understood by the organization,
and amenable to replication. There were no difficulties in entering data or generating
charts in the TST software program. In terms of data analysis, the software program is
limited to generating rate of defective cases chart, the defect ranking chart, and the
comparison chart. But after completing each step of the TST, the level of detail provided
was adequate.
Recommendations
A limitation to this quality improvement program was the length of observation
time in the baseline and improvement phases. When this QIP project is replicated, the
Joint Commission recommendations should be adhered to, that is 100 observations from
each of the three areas with no more than 4-5 observations per day.
Conclusions
The findings of this quality improvement program reflect great improvement in
not only the way the surgery center reduced the risk of WSS but in the way the
organization communicated their common goals of patient safety, job performance, and
risk reduction. Most of the information presented was not new to the surgery team.
When individuals were asked if they understood the elements of a Time Out, nearly
everyone knew what they were ‘supposed to do’ yet the findings show that knowing and
doing are sometimes far apart. Like all organizations, the challenge this organization
faces lies is the last phase of the TST, Sustaining the Gains. As personnel leave the
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organization and new employees are hired, the standing policies and lessons learned from
the program risk fade from practice. Left in place to educate the surgery team on the
importance of patient verification and risks of WSS are the JIT coaches, the
administrators, and trained observers from this program. Without support of all three,
changes adopted with each chosen Targeted Solution will be lost.
WSS is an avoidable event that compromises patient safety. Nurse consultants
play a powerful role in enabling surgical staff to utilize the TST Program to re-examine
their existing practice, change behaviors as needed, and create a culture of safety in
reducing the risks of WSS and promoting patient safety.
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APPENDIX A
THE UNIVERSAL PROTOCOL BY THE JOINT COMMISSION
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APPENDIX B
WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION SURGICAL SAFETY CHECKLIST
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APPENDIX C
AORN COMPREHENSIVE SURGICAL CHECKLIST

PREPROCEDURE

SIGN-IN

TIME-OUT

SIGN-OUT

CHECK-IN
In Holding Area

Before Induction of Anesthesia

Before Skin Incision

Patient/patient representative
actively confirms with Registered
Nurse (RN):

RN and anesthesia care provider
confirm:

Initiated by designated team member

Identity □ Yes
Procedure and procedure site □ Yes
Consent(s) □ Yes
□ N/A
Site marked □ Yes
by person performing the procedure

Confirmation of: identity, procedure,
procedure site and consent(s) □ Yes
Site marked □ Yes □ N/A
by person performing the procedure
Patient allergies □ Yes □ N/A

RN confirms presence of:
History and physical □ Yes
Preanesthesia assessment
□ Yes

Difficult airway or aspiration risk?
□ No
□ Yes (preparation confirmed)

Risk of blood loss (> 500 ml)
Diagnostic and radiologic test results □ Yes □ N/A
# of units available ______
□ Yes
□ N/A
Blood products
□ Yes
□ N/A

Anesthesia safety check completed
□ Yes

Any special equipment, devices,
implants
□ Yes
□ N/A

Briefing:
All members of the team have
discussed care plan and addressed
concerns
□ Yes

Include in Preprocedure checkin as per institutional custom:
Beta blocker medication given
(SCIP) □ Yes □ N/A
Venous thromboembolism
prophylaxis ordered (SCIP)
□Yes □ N/A
Normothermia measures (SCIP)
□ Yes □ N/A

Before the Patient Leaves the Operating
Room
RN confirms:

All other activities to be suspended (unless a lifethreatening emergency)
Introduction of team members □ Yes
Name of operative procedure
Completion of sponge, sharp, and
All:
instrument counts □ Yes
□ N/A
Confirmation of the following: identity,
Specimens identified and labeled
procedure, incision site, consent(s)
□ Yes
□ N/A
□ Yes
Any equipment problems to be addressed?
Site is marked and visible □ Yes □ N/A
□ Yes
□ N/A
Relevant images properly labeled and displayed
□ Yes
□ N/A
Any equipment concerns?
Anticipated Critical Events
Surgeon:
States the following:
□ critical or nonroutine steps
□ case duration
□ anticipated blood loss
Anesthesia Provider:
□ Antibiotic prophylaxis within one hour
before incision □ Yes □ N/A
□ Additional concerns?
Scrub and circulating nurse:
□ Sterilization indicators have been
confirmed
□ Additional concerns?

To all team members:
What are the key concerns for recovery and
management of this patient?
_________________________________
_________________________________
_________________________________
_________________________________
_________________________________
_________________________________
_________________________________
_________________________________
June 2013
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APPENDIX D
SURGICAL BOOKING PROCESS AUDIT TOOL
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APPENDIX E
PRE-OP HOLDING PROCESS AUDIT TOOL
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APPENDIX E
PRE-OP HOLDING PROCESS AUDIT TOOL
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APPENDIX F
OPERATING ROOM AUDIT TOOL
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APPENDIX F
OPERATING ROOM AUDIT TOOL
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APPENDIX G
RATE OF DEFECTIVE CASES CHART (PROPORTION OR P CHART)

What is a rate of defective cases chart?
A rate of defective cases chart, also called a proportion or P chart, analyzes the percent
(or proportion) of defective surgical cases. It also shows the rate of defective cases. This
chart is especially helpful when dealing with inconsistent sample sizes, for example,
when the number of observations varies widely on a daily basis.
Why do you need a rate of defective cases chart?
A rate of defective cases chart shows your percentage of defective cases on a daily basis
and how it decreases over time. A key benefit of the rate of defective cases chart is that it
shows when you have significantly improved.
What types of data are displayed in a rate of defective cases chart?
1. Control limits: Lines above and below the average line. The control
limits reflect variations in the defective case rates over time. Typically, 95
percent of the data will fall within the control limits. Data that fall outside
the control limits are represented by a red dot, signifying that the process
has changed. These dots show when a process is “out of control” – either
negatively (upper control limit) or positively (lower control limit). The
control limits usually start wide as the rate of defective cases varies greatly
day-to-day and become narrower as rates decrease and remain in a
consistent, high range. Because the number of daily observations can
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impact the width of the control limits, it is important to have a consistent
number of observations every day. Five to 10 observations per day is
recommended.
2. Trend line: Each point on the line represents the number of cases with
one or more defects (i.e., defective cases) for each day. Most of these
points will fall within the control limits (see #3). In the sample chart, you
will see that the points on the line that fall outside of the control limit lines
are represented by a red dot. Red dots signify special circumstances that
should be investigated to determine what was different on this day
compared to other days. For example, the special circumstances may be
related to the successful implementation of an intervention. It is important
to understand the cause of special circumstances because they can become
“quick wins” to reduce the risk of wrong site surgery. For instance, if you
can identify that the defects involve one particular type of surgery rather
than all surgeries. The goal is to move these points lower, until they
reach or exceed your goal defective case rate (i.e., 50 percent
improvement from baseline rates) and sustain it. This means that you have
achieved significant improvement in your process. Note: If you are
collecting a very small sample size, such as one or two observations in a
day, this can cause the trend line to vary significantly and make it difficult
to determine the direction of improvement.
3. Stage line: The stage line shows the end of the baseline data collection
period and the start of interventions to reduce the risk of wrong site
surgery. The stage line provides a before and after comparison of rates of
defective cases.
4. Average line: The red line represents the overall average (or mean) rate of
defective surgical cases that have been found to have at least one defect.
The average may be recalculated every time data is entered into the
database. The goal is to move the average line down from the baseline
phase, which means the rate of defective cases is decreasing.
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